The crisis of cost recovery and the waste of the industrialised nations in
Crisis: "the point in the progress of a disease when an important development or change takes place; the turning point of a disease for better or worse; also applied to any marked or sudden variation occurring in the progress of a disease" (Oxford English Dictionary) This paper is concerned with pathological crisis in the Oxford English Dictionary sense. The disease is disemployment in the advanced countries and this paper argues that the wasting disease will take an acute turn for the worse with the entrance of low wage countries into large scale international trade in manufactures. This development will aggravate chronic internal problems within the advanced economies and generally intensify the loss of manufacturing employment and pressure on pay and conditions in all the advanced countries. We also predict that it could undermine hitherto successful and exemplary advanced economies such as Germany and Japan.
The paper which develops these arguments is organised in a relatively straightforward way. A first framework section argues the case for a problem shift which relocates the problem of national competitivity in a social accounting framework which focuses attention on cash generation and cost recovery; it establishes the basic point that workers must always be sacked by enterprises which are unable to recover their costs and realise a surplus over and above labour conversion costs. The next section briefly outlines the world we have lost and looks back at post war competition in the old order between established high wage industrial countries whose social settlements put a floor under competition. The next three sections of the paper outline the current developments which, if taken together, justify the idea of crisis and a new disorder: the first of these developments is the external threat of ultra cash-generative low wage competition like the Koreans; the second internal development is the emergence of major sectors like cars and whole national economies like Germany where cash generation is problematic; the third and final development is the mutation of institutions and behaviour which, on Anglo-American evidence, accompanies the extraction of cash from declining industrial bases. A concluding section sets the evidence and argument into perspective and offers some interpretation as well as a discussion of implications.
The arguments in this paper have developed out of our work on the auto industry (Williams et al., 1994c) . This paper moves on to consider a broader range of evidence on the electrical/electronics sector and manufacturing as a whole. If we aim to formulate broader generalisations on the basis of this evidence, the generalisations (as in our earlier work) still concern manufacturing rather than services and tradeable goods rather than the sheltered sectors. Manufacturing in this broad sense now accounts for a relatively small share of Gross Domestic Product or employment in the advanced countries; in employment terms, for example, manufacturing accounts for only 18-32 percent of employment within the different Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries who generate most of their employment from sheltered services. But, this observation does not justify the conclusion that manufacturing does not matter. The manufacturing sector remains strategic in all the advanced economies because it directly generates high wage blue collar employment and indirectly generates the exports necessary to pay for imports and avoid trade constraint. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, the average wage is 25 percent higher in manufacturing than in services; and, in all the advanced countries, manufacturing accounts for 75 to 90 percent of exports with autos and electricals alone accounting for 35 percent of world trade. Furthermore, our social accounting framework and our argument about cash and cost recovery can be extended to sheltered services. From this point of view, services are simply about different pressures but the same outcome in terms of disemployment and deteriorating pay and conditions: the pressures arising from competition between high and low wage social settlements in tradeable goods are reinforced by competition within social settlements in sheltered services. Research on these destructive forms of internal competition, especially privatisation and deregulation, is the next priority on our agenda.
A Social Accounting Framework of Analysis: Labour Costs and the Cash Surplus
The issues which concern us are usually constructed on the terrain of economics where the debate is whether problems about national competitivity justify deviations from free trade. Recent American economists' debates on competitivity clearly demonstrate this approach which arises from the strong assumption of orthodox economics in favour of free exchange as a basis for efficiency gains which increase consumer welfare. Producer welfare is frequently ignored on the implied grounds that displaced factors will be (relatively) smoothly re-employed elsewhere. We are proposing a problem shift which moves the argument onto the terrain of social accounting.
We need first to confront one aspect of recent discussions. It might seem that in their concern about American competitivity and their recognition of the ubiquity of oligopoly, strategic interaction and structural impediment, that some economists have repudiated the free trade stance. Closer examination shows that they are only concerned about limited special cases. Thus, Laura Tyson's most recent book argues the case for "cautious activism" in the special case of high technology trade because oligopoly and structural impediments are the norm in these sectors which "make special contributions to the long term health of the American economy" (Tyson, 1992, p.12) in terms of productivity, technology development and high wage employment. But low and medium technology trade, which on Tyson's classification in 1988 accounted for 74 percent of American manufactured imports (Tyson, 1992 , p.28 see also Reich, 1993 , is best left to free trade. In any event, Tyson style special case arguments are fiercely resisted by most economists. Foreign Affairs recently carried a provocative essay by Paul Krugman whose message was in its title, "competitiveness: a dangerous obsession".
Those of us who work outside economics draw two conclusions from these debates. First, those who, like Tyson, argue a modest competitivity case on economic terrain will be violently attacked by those of more conservative persuasion whose policy prescriptions are those of the liberal market. Second, those who, like Krugman, attack competitivity have not demonstrated it is really an irrelevant problem and that free trade is a good thing: they have instead shown that the problem definition and the interventionist policy prescription cannot be sustained on the terrain of economics. Our response is simply to shift the argument onto the terrain of social accounting, the new discourse which we are creating by fusing an accounting concept of conversion cost recovery with new social categories such as "social settlement". The accounting categories are conceptually important in themselves and because they open up new measurement possibilities when they match the categories of company financial reporting and official statistics. The concept of social settlement is important because it allows us to reject aspects of the a priori of economics: most of what we register positively as producer welfare and decent pay and conditions through the enforcement of social minima appears negatively in economics as a series of obstacles which stand in the way of labour market adjustment and job creation.
The first and most important point to explain is that social accounting focuses not on profit but on the cash surplus available to the enterprise, sector or national economy. The mission of the capitalist enterprise is to recover costs which includes the requirement to generate a cash surplus over and above labour conversion costs: the cash surplus covers the productive requirement of capital consumption (viz depreciation); reinvestment in new product and process; plus the financial requirements of interest payments and distributions to shareholders which meet the claims of the rentier. If cash generation fails, it becomes difficult to stay in the business in sectors like cars and electronics where the maintenance of market share depends on new models whose development absorbs large amounts of cash. The rentier's preoccupation with profit is understandable but unjustified from a broader social point of view because (retained and distributed) profit usually accounts for a relatively small proportion of the cash surplus which is available to the enterprise and from which other claims must be satisfied. For example, under a self denying ordinance, committed, long term rentiers may make modest financial claims for distributed profits; but this makes no difference at all if cash flow has failed and the requirements of productive renewal cannot be met.
In enterprises, sectors and national economies, cash generation is always problematic because cash is the surplus over and above labour conversion costs and labour normally takes 70 per cent of the value added in manufacturing or service enterprises. Cash normally accounts for no more than 30 per cent of value added: free cash accounts for even less because depreciation is the first, fixed charge on the surplus. Labour's share of value added (the inverse of cash flow) typically fluctuates within a relatively narrow band +/-10 per cent either side of 70 over the trade cycle. In whole sectors and national economies, labour's share will always be re-normalised around 70 per cent in the long run, although this is not true at the level of the enterprise in the short run. Re-normalisation is relatively unproblematic if it is possible to pass on increased costs to the consumer; if that is impossible, the main burden of adjustment falls on the workforce. The ratio stays at a boring 70 per cent but at the expense of interesting changes in the numbers employed within the enterprise, sector or national economy.
If cash generation fails and labour's share rides up above 70 per cent, the social consequences are likely to be considerable because firms, sectors and national economies which fail to generate cash can no longer balance the interests of the different stakeholders (workers, management and shareholders) who all make different claims on the value added fund. This conflict will usually be resolved by sacrificing the interest of the worker stakeholders whose wages and salaries make the first claim on value added. The different national forms of capitalism are all subject to one iron law; when cost recovery fails, the workers must be sacrificed because their wages are an expense which prevents managers from productively reinvesting in the business and shareholders from claiming the financial rights of property. Shareholders may temporarily pass up their rights to distributed profit, but that will only delay adjustment at the expense of the workforce in any business where management needs cash for productive renewal. If the social consequences of renormalisation at the expense of the workforce are considerable, it is important to understand the conditions under which labour's share rises above 70 per cent and the options available to enterprises, sectors and economies which must re-normalise labour's share.
Our analysis of the conditions of cost recovery puts considerable emphasis on the demand side: where others put the main emphasis on management agency from the supply side, we instead emphasise structural factors on the demand side. Thus, we differ fundamentally from orthodox economics whose discussion of firms and sectors focuses almost entirely on supply side influences through its sub discourse on productivity which attaches an exaggerated significance to what happens inside the factory of the capitalist enterprise: these supply side assumptions have been uncritically appropriated by the discourses of management which propose reorganisation of production and the labour process through hard and soft changes like Just in Time (JIT) for the machines and Human Resource Management (HRM) for the workers. If the balance between management agency and structural factors is historically variable, we would emphasise that demand difficulties about market saturation and cyclicality are usually quite literally beyond management which can only downsize in the hope of finding a cash surplus. Conversely, when demand is brisk and plants are fully loaded, most firms can generate cash; in repetitive manufacturing, it is usually the last 20 per cent of capacity utilisation which generates the cash. At the cyclical and structural extremes of boom and bust, financial results inside the firm, sector and national economy reflect external market conditions much more than purposive management action.
There is, of course, some scope for management action to improve financial and physical results and our accounting schema is designed to identify the possibilities and options for improving cost recovery. The accounting desideratum is always the same: the firm or sector must generate a larger financial surplus over labour costs (which equal physical labour hours  wage cost per hour). The key question therefore is whether and how firms and sectors can manage cost reduction by taking physical hours and/or wage costs out of the product and do so in ways which generate a sustainable advantage because other firms and sectors cannot follow: fairly obviously, if everybody can manage cost reduction, individual firms and sectors are unlikely to improve their collective financial results because the benefits will usually be appropriated by consumers in the form of cheaper product. In considering the different options for cost reduction we would discriminate between direct and indirect productionist responses and financial engineering which all involve considerable social pain because cost reduction means variable combinations of head count reduction, intensification through "speed up", rate busting and relocation to lower wage geographic areas or marginal social groups. It is a neglected truism that the areas in which there is scope for management action it can often embody these less endearing features.
Cost reduction through taking labour hours and cost out of the product in the factory would be unnecessary if cost recovery could be improved through repositioning the product in the market. This kind of repositioning depends on supply and demand side conditions which together determine the scope for non-price competition between differentiated products. On the supply side, producing firms must be able to add real or imaginary characteristics which justify a premium price as, for example, Mercedes Benz can but Compaq cannot. On the demand side, the composition of demand must be such as to generate the volume demand base which covers the tooling expense of repetitive manufacturing. Those who sell high ticket items in small national markets quickly discover that the market is a major constraint.
Builders of upmarket products can hope to recover long hours and high wages in the market place so that they do not have to drive the workers in the factory. But this, of course, may be humane aspiration rather than sustainable achievement: as we argue later in this paper, the crisis of cost recovery is now most severe in firms and sectors (like German and Swedish motor vehicle manufacturers) which once prospered by selling up market product. The "flexible specialisation" (flec-spec) scenario, as sketched by Piore and Sabel, held out the hope of cost recovery solutions for most manufacturing sectors where "end of mass production" demand patterns would encourage producers generally to move the product up market and offer greater variety: their only question was about whether existing firms and regions could manage the transition to the new forms of economic organisation required in the new era. The flex-spec outcome would be nice but, like the perfect day, it is unlikely to happen (Williams et al., 1987) . The overall balance between de-commodification and recommodification is uncertain because both principles operate in different product markets at the same time. Demand for variety may not improve cost recovery if it results in increased development and tooling costs. Furthermore, as we demonstrate later in this article, the evidence so far does not support the crucial assumption that in most sectors consumers will pay for different and up market products.
If cost reduction then becomes the name of the game, the direct productionist response of cost reducers is to take physical labour hours out of the product or to take financial cost out of the product by accessing lower wages; ceteris paribus, both options will lower costs and improve cost recovery. The balance between the two options depends on a variety of considerations which can be briefly analyzed. In repetitive manufacturing of cars, white goods and brown goods, it is usually possible to take labour hours out of the product either by redesigning processes in mechanical products or by redesigning the product (to incorporate more functions in one component) in electronics. If this is the response which the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) advocates of "lean production" (Womack et al., 1990) recommend, many managers are at least as interested in accessing lower wages; if you can't beat them on hours, why not join them in low wages by shifting production offshore?
The balance between physical intervention in production and financially motivated relocation of production depends on a number of considerations. The two key variables are the extent to which hours reduction generates a sustainable advantage and the financial leverage that is obtained through relocation. Hours reduction is sufficient only if the one firm or sector can achieve hours reduction which its competitors cannot; in any world where most of the sectoral players are converging on low build hours, hours reduction is a necessary condition of survival but not a sustainable source of advantage. Relocation of production generates additional leverage if relocation does not involve a build hours penalty and if relocation accesses national social settlements where wages are substantially lower, hours are longer and the social mark up is lower. The assumption of this argument is that it is very difficult for the individual firm or sector to reduce wages and conditions within an existing economy where these are determined by external structural forces.
Social settlement is our concept of a national or regional/bloc set of structural variables which is semi-fixed because it is embedded in institutional structures and sets a national floor under competition. On the supply side, the settlement includes conventions about wages and hours worked, national systems for allocating social charges such as pension costs and patterns of segmentation with definite wage gradients between large assemblers and their usually smaller suppliers. On the demand side, the main variables are market space and pricing conventions which determine the level of capacity utilisation and the possibility of recovering the costs of underutilisation in cyclical conditions.
The central argument of this paper is that competition between social settlements where the structural variables have different values is seriously threatening for workers in high wage, relatively privileged settlements. Within any social settlement, new firms and sectors typically move along an arc like trajectory which ends in a descent into ordinariness as average firms reach the limits of the market. When build hours converge, competition between social settlements to supply tradeable goods to mass markets means that price matters and free trade leads to victory for the producers who operate in low cost social settlements which have structural advantages in terms of wages and hours so that they can generate more cash from any given price level. Enterprises which are disadvantaged by their social settlement will either run down production or transfer production elsewhere if the values of key variables within their native settlement cannot be changed. From this point of view, the development of low wage Asian economies opens up new relocation possibilities and intensifies the external pressures for down sizing the workforce which arise from preexisting internal problems about cost recovery in all the advanced economies. These pressures will be intensified by the secondary response of financial engineering which displaces the efforts of management from the factory to the Bourses and banking parlours.
The Old Order: Competition amongst the few with a Social Floor Our framework on competitivity is not only conceptually different, it is also designed to be filled with empirical content: indeed, the next three sections of this paper are largely concerned with pouring empirical content into the empty conceptual boxes of the last section. By way of contrast, much of the orthodox literature on competitivity has a negligible empirical content. Consider, for example, Lester Thurrow's (1994) Head to Head, which makes the strong assumption that the "economic battle" of the next generation will be between the three major trading blocs of this generation (Europe, America and Japan) and predicts that Europe will win. Thurrow does provide a variety of supporting arguments and illustrations to justify his triad assumption, but his book lacks systematic empirical content: its 336 pages include just seven statistical tables and illustrations. The more systematic evidence presented below suggests that Thurrow has confused the old and new economic orders: as we argue in this section, the old order was distinguished by limited competition amongst the established few, while the next section shows how the new disorder sees the entrance of extra players whose competition is destabilising.
Like other 1940s architects of the post war order, Keynes assumed that an expanded trade in manufactures would involve their supply by a few established players within a relatively unchanging international division of labour where Europe and North America had a virtual monopoly of manufactures which would be exchanged for raw materials and food stuffs from the rest of the world. In a famous passage of the 1930s, Keynes had observed that he was not a free trader if free trade meant the closure of the British steel or cars industry. But by the 1940s he was confident that it would not come to that because the competitive outcome of freer trade would be tolerable within a world of limited competition. Thus, the panic of the late 1940s and early 1950s was about how Europe could meet the challenge of low cost American production under free trade conditions: the result was reports by the OEEC (precursor of the OECD) and by the Anglo American Council on Productivity (AACP) which both argued that efficiency improvement through emulation of American practice could meet this challenge.
The developments of the next fifty years generally vindicated Keynes' optimism. The main development was the emergence of new forms of intra-regional competition within Europe; these developments especially affected the big four West European countries (France, Italy, UK and West Germany) which in the mid-1950s supplied something like 90 per cent of their requirement for manufactures from factories within their national boundaries. By the mid 1980s, these countries were importing 35 per cent or more of their manufactures, mainly from other European countries. The result was a gentle process of integration within the regional European Community (EC) bloc; as we have argued elsewhere (Cutler et al., 1989) , Germany and Spain gained from this process, Britain lost and the rest stayed more or less where they were. Inter-regional competition between major blocs was much more limited. The Atlantic threat of cheap American exports to Europe, which had exercised the OEEC and the AACP, never really materialised because the Americans preferred to meet European demands by branch manufacture within Europe. Significant inter-regional competition was inaugurated across the Pacific by the unexpected Japanese success against the Americans in the mid-1970s. This upset inaugurated serious inter-regional competition and trade friction because the main Japanese export market was the US and American penetration of the Japanese market was blocked by protection and structural obstacles.
As a first generalisation, we can say that, from the 1940s to the 1980s, the competition between the few established producers of manufactures was limited because the established players had social settlements which were different but all involved some combination of high wages, short hours and a high mark up for social charges. The one successful new entrant of the 1960s and 1970s was Japan which started off looking very different but increasingly came to resemble the established industrial countries. In the 1990s, Japan and all the other established players now face the challenge of new competitors with very different characteristics. Table 1 illustrates this point by presenting basic data on total labour costs per employee in manufacturing industries in various advanced economies (including Japan); the Korean data provides a "new entrant" point of reference and comparison. In the average advanced country, labour costs per employee in manufacturing averaged $20,000 over the decade of the 1980s. In Britain, which has become the low wage outlier, the average labour cost per employee was still nearly $16,000. As table 1 also shows, industrialising Asian countries like Korea are at an entirely different level. The Korean average cost is $7,250 per manufacturing employee over the decade of the 1980s and this average is biased upwards by the recent rise in Korean wages towards the end of the decade; in every year up to 1987, Korean labour costs were below $7,000 per employee.
If all the established producers of manufactures are high labour cost producers, it should also be observed that the group of established producers also includes significant labour cost differences and movements: the established are not all and always the same. However, in the period up to the mid 1980s, most of these differences and movements were stabilising in that they cancelled or reduced national competitive advantage. If we begin by considering differences amongst the established, the US and Germany have historically had higher labour costs than other advanced countries; table 1, for example, shows that US labour costs are on average twice as high as in UK and that German labour costs are usually 50 per cent higher than those in Britain. In both cases, the high wages were a way of distributing the benefits of cost reduction and cost recovery in a way which cancelled what would otherwise have been a massive advantage in terms of cash generation. The Germans are the European masters of cost recovery through the production of bourgeois products, epitomised by Mercedes Benz and BMW, while the Americans were long the champions of cost reduction who operated with a lower level of labour input per unit of output. As for the movements, the most striking is that of Japan where money and real wages have risen rapidly: Japan entered the scene as a low wage new entrant in the 1960s and 1970s but by the early 1980s Japanese labour costs per employee matched those of countries like Italy or Britain and by the end of the decade equalled those of Germany and the US.
Annual labour costs are high in all the advanced countries because (except in Japan) the cost effects of high hourly wage rates are reinforced by relatively short working hours and hefty mark ups to cover social charges; the social settlements of the advanced countries can be defined as variable combinations of these three invariant elements. The position on hours worked is illustrated by table 2 which presents data on hours worked in electrical engineering which are fairly representative of those worked in other manufacturing sectors within each national economy; in each case, hours worked in the other economies are compared with those worked in Germany which provides the base of 100 in each year. As table 2 shows, in three pace setting advanced countries (Germany, Italy and Sweden) hours worked are at or below 1,550 per year. They are higher in many other advanced industrial countries, but hours worked are seldom much over 2,000 hours per year in any of the long established industrial countries. By way of contrast, the Asian old and new entrants start where the Europeans stop. Japanese wages rose rapidly in the 1980s, but hours worked did not fall; in the boom years after 1984, the Japanese were working more than 2,200 hours per worker per year. The Koreans, who epitomise the next generation of new entrants, put in 2,700 hours or more in every year up to 1989. Across a broad range of sectors, including autos as well as electricals and electronics, the Korean working year of 2,750 hours is almost exactly twice as long as the Swedish working year of 1,400 hours or less in the late 1980s. If the Swedes have to employ two workers to deliver the same number of hours as one Korean worker, that costs partly because it increases the bill for social charges. Table 3 presents data on the mark up for social charges in the different advanced economies. We again use sectoral data to illustrate the pattern; the data in table 3 covers the auto sector which is again fairly representative of the position at least in the larger firms of the different economies. These figures should carry a health warning because there are many ways of charging the costs of health, social security and retirement to taxpayers as well as to employers and employees; it is therefore difficult and dangerous to interpret them. But the statistics do show that employers bear a large charge in pace-setting industrial countries like Germany, Sweden and Italy where the social mark up more or less doubles the basic hourly rate. Even in countries like the US which has no tradition of universal minima, or Britain where employers do not pay much towards an increasingly exiguous minimum, social charges add some 35 per cent to the hourly wage rate. Again, the pattern is that Asian countries start where the Europeans stop; in the old entrant, Japan, the mark up is some 30 per cent and in the new entrant, Korea, the mark up is no higher than 20 per cent. From this review of the evidence on labour costs, hours worked and social mark up we draw three conclusions. First, the international differences between established industrial countries and new entrants involve more than large differences in hourly wages; annual labour cost parity with the Koreans would require a much longer working year and fewer social benefits for most workers in advanced countries. Second, over the past 50 years in the old order, industrial leadership was associated with high wages in the American case and also with short hours and high social mark up in the German case; if one does not believe in marginal productivity, there is no reason why this association should be maintained in the next period.
Finally, in the old order, the broad similarities in social settlement (plus compensating differences and movements) put a social floor under competition which was effectively confined to high wage countries plus one new entrant, Japan, which became a high wage country. This floor will be removed if a succession of low wage new entrants, like Korea, succeed in matching (or substantially closing the gap on) hours to build against Western high labour cost competitors.
The New Disorder: Element (a) The Emergence of Ultra Cash-Generative Low Wage Competition Analysis of the new disorder eludes the measures which were generated by economics to explain an earlier situation. In constructing an index of international competitiveness, economics relies on Relative Unit Labour Cost (RULC) (nominal wages over real product): the focus is on price competition via relative movements in wages motored by differences in domestic inflation rates. This was relevant to the old order and the contest between established players, though even then it could never accommodate the Germans and the Swedes, who built their national economies on the principle of market place cost recovery not factory cost reduction. In the new disorder, where there are large differences in absolute wages between established players and new entrants, absolute wages and build hours are much more relevant. Social accounting constructs the results in terms of cash (nominal sales minus nominal wages) which generates the interesting observation that new entrants are powerful competitors because they are usually ultra cash generative.
The cash premium does not of course come from low wages per se but from the combination of low wages with internationally competitive build hours in the production of products whose price level is determined by the cost recovery requirements of high wage producers. And from this point of view, the crucial issue is the build hours requirement of established and new producers which is seldom brought into focus in academic social science: as we have pointed out elsewhere ) the MIT comparisons of car assembly hours are unhlepful and misleading. But, in the case of the cars sector, the unit of output is such that it is possible to make simple calculations of sectoral hours to build a vehicle by dividing vehicles produced into hours available within each national sector which is in turn obtained by multiplying number of workers by a realistic estimate of hours worked. The results are interesting and alarming because in the cars industry at least, the evidence suggests that all the different national sectors, old and new, are converging on the same low build hours. The evidence summarised in table 4 shows that the Americans long ago found out how to build a vehicle in less than 200 hours; the Japanese closed the gap and passed them in the 1970s; the French and all the South European producers pulled the same trick in the 1980s and the Germans are now setting about doing something similar in the 1990s. Significantly, the Koreans started off twenty years ago with a huge build hour requirement of more than 3,000 hours which they have been steadily reducing to a creditable 350 hours by the later 1980s and a fully competitive 200 hours by the early 1990s. This makes the Koreans competitive because the scope for sustained further hours reduction is apparently limited by product and process characteristics; on the evidence of America and Japan, 150 hours +/-20 appears to be the irreducible build hour requirement. The evidence in table 4 allows us to reinterpret Japanese success and to present the Koreans in a new light. Low wages were and are the secret of success for Asian new entrants in the 1990s as they were for Japan in the 1970s. The Japanese never had a huge 2:1 physical build hours advantage over the Americans which MIT imagined (Womack et al., 1992) ; the Japanese were low cost producers because in every year up to 1985 their major assemblers paid wages which were in dollar terms half or less than half of those paid in Detroit at the same time as their suppliers paid even lower wages. The Koreans represent a second phase of Asian low wage competition because they are pulling the same trick as the Japanese; get labour hours down to a competitive level and then ride to market success on the back of much lower wages. The point is proved by table 5 which presents some basic data on sectoral labour cost per vehicle calculated by multiplying motor sector build hours  the wage rate in US dollars. Since 1980, the Koreans have had a labour cost of $1,100 -$1,800 in each vehicle and that is substantially lower than the advanced countries which (including Japan after 1985) have $1,800 or more of labour in each vehicle. The high wage countries, like US and Germany, have more than $3,000 of motor sector labour in each vehicle.
The question, of course, is whether vehicle manufacturing is typical of other sectors where the physical unit of output is more difficult to measure. The balance of technical argument and financial evidence suggests that vehicles are typical. Cars represent the most difficult and demanding kind of repetitive manufacturing because the product is highly engineered and incorporates 20,000 separate parts; if Korean conglomerates can manage competitive build hours in cars, they will easily manage it in microwaves and VCRs. This technical conjecture is confirmed by financial results in different sectors of the Korean economy: the results in terms of cash generation are broadly similar in cars and electricals/electronics.
The Korean capacity to generate cash from manufacturing is truly awesome. Table 6 presents the basic data on labour's share in motor vehicles and electrical engineering and it shows that right through the period 1976-88 the Koreans invert the usual 70/30 ratio; where competitors are lucky to realise 30 cents in each dollar of value added as cash, the Koreans realise the best part of 70 cents as cash. In the western economies, we have never seen whole sectors with this kind of performance; in the West, 30-40 per cent labour shares have been the prerogative of a few heroic exception firms such as Ford (Highland Park). The only sectoral and national precedent comes from Japan in the period when it was a new entrant; labour's share of value added was below 50 per cent in Japanese manufacturing as a whole in the 1950s and at or below 55 per cent throughout the 1960s. The explanation is relatively simple. The Japanese, as new entrants in the 1950s and 1960s, were, like the Koreans in the 1970s and 1980s, selling on their home and export markets at prices which reflected the cost recovery requirements of their high labour cost western competitors; as their labour costs per unit were dramatically lower, their cash recovery was phenomenal.
The ultra cash-generative enter a virtuous circle of expansion which is funded by their surplus. During the 1980s, real manufacturing value added (MVA) or net industrial output has grown by around 10 per cent per annum in economies like Korea, Malaysia and Singapore; whereas the established Western economies have MVA growth rates of only 1.5 to 3.5 per cent. Rapid compound growth from a small base produces significant results fairly rapidly; the Korean vehicles industry currently produces 2 million vehicles per annum and its electronics industry accounts for 40 per cent of the televisions which are traded internationally. The factories of the new entrants are always fully loaded because in export markets they can sell entry level products at very attractive prices. The cash generative also have unusual ability to move across and up national markets; the cash from entry level products allow them to price in a predatory way, undertake expense investment in distribution and invest in an endless stream of new models and production facilities which take them up market. If the Japanese precedent is anything to go by, all this will be attributed to superior management techniques which generate increased efficiency and ailing Western firms will be told (for a price) that they can save themselves by adopting the appropriate techniques. The more intellectually interesting questions concern the conditions under which national economies move onto and off the trajectory of high growth and ultra cash generation. Low wages are a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving onto the trajectory. On the basis of Japanese and Korean experience, three supplementary conditions are equally important: first, a growing domestic market which provides an unproblematic volume base for domestic firms; second, a political structure which mobilises corporate resources to prevent annexation as a dependent assembly site for foreign players; and, third, an economic infrastructure with diverse capabilities so that the new entrant can capture a substantial part of the production chain. A growth trajectory may be possible where one of these three conditions is not satisfied; but it is very unlikely where two or more conditions are absent, as in the case of India or the more benighted parts of eastern Europe. In this respect, industrialism is like Christian salvation; many are called but few are chosen.
Countries move off the trajectory of high growth as money and real wages rise through the combined effects of concessions to the workforce and currency appreciation; as the Renault executive cheerfully told us "wages don't stay low for long". They do however stay low for long enough to relocate capacity and create major new corporate players. In the first phase of Asian low wage competition, between 1978 and 1991 US car production fell by 3.7 million and Japanese car production increased by more than 4 million. The residuary legatees of this expansion are the firms which managed it, like Nissan and Toyota. We expect Korean expansion to leave a similar legacy of production capacity and new household names like Hyundai, Daewoo and Samsung. As wages rise, these firms will, like their Japanese predecessors, lose their low labour cost advantage but that does not remove them from the global scene nor ease the low wage pressure on Western producers if the Koreans are succeeded by another generation of new entrants. In any case, the labour market tightening effect only operates strongly in relatively small countries. Established Western producers may be grateful that the Korean workforce includes only 19 million workers and the Malaysian workforce just 7 million; they would presumably prefer not to think about the Chinese workforce which numbers 583 million. The prospects of Guangdong province may be uncertain but it will be a little while before a tightening labour market raises Chinese wages.
The New Disorder: Element (b) The Emergence of Major Sectors and Whole Advanced Economies with Chronic Problems about Cash Generation
Economists, such as Paul Krugman, argue that the established industrial countries should not fear low wage competition from Asian new entrants or more generally from the Third World. Those who are not convinced by his theoretical arguments about wages, marginal productivity and the gains from trade (Krugman, 1994b ) may yet be swayed by his empirical observation about bloc autarchy (Krugman, 1994a) . Krugman argues that the competitivity debate rests on a false analogy between companies and (large) countries or blocs which generate most of their income by selling goods and services internally to their own citizens: domestically generated income accounts for around 90 per cent of EC, US and Japanese GNP. From an orthodox economic point of view, the effects of trade must then be very limited because the circular flow has few leakages and domestically generated income constitutes an unproblematic insulator or cushion. The main determinant of long term income growth must be the rate of growth of domestic productivity which is limited by supply side constraints; thus, Krugman argues that Europe does not have an external trade problem but an internal productivity problem exacerbated by labour market rigidities which prevent the creation of low wage jobs (Krugman, 1994a) .
In its own terms, this view is less than convincing. As Krugman's critics (Prestowitz, 1994) have observed, a limited trade exposure to competitors with very different cost structures is likely to have leveraged effects on the domestic economy and may well be seriously destabilising. And from the rather different viewpoint of social accounting, the recent developments look much more ominous for two reasons. First, as we argue in this section, the increased external pressure from new entrants is particularly threatening for established industrial countries because this group of countries already has internal difficulties about cost recovery which reflect chronic demand side problems. Second, as we argue in the next section, enterprise level attempts by managers in the advanced countries to solve problems about cash generation are likely to resolve the narrow financial problem at the expense of considerable social cost as institutions and behaviour mutate pathologically.
There is of course nothing new about industrial problem sectors which run with high labour shares and do not generate cash. In all the advanced economies, the process of structural change has traditionally worked by wasting such sectors out of existence; in the case of some low value added manufacturing, like cheap clothing and textiles, the process of wasting has been associated with the transference of such activity to low labour cost areas. But the process of change is now likely to speed up because of three new developments on the cost recovery front in the advanced countries: first, all of manufacturing in some advanced countries has apparently chronic problems about cash generation; second, large parts of some important high value added sectors, such as cars and electricals, have problems about cash generation in most of the advanced countries; third, these trends are developing against a background of worsening demand side problems about market cyclicality and saturation.
In terms of cash generation, the worst placed national economies are those like Germany and Sweden which have traditionally covered the costs of expensive social settlements by selling up-market product; this situation is both tragic and ironic when these two countries have been social ideals and role models for the centre left in other advanced countries. The problems of German manufacturing are particularly striking because of their gravity and because the Germans account for more than half of EC manufacturing output. Table 7 illustrates the problem by presenting data on labour's share of value added in German manufacturing as a whole, as well as in Germany's competitors; the position is broadly similar in German autos and slightly worse in the German electricals sector. In German manufacturing as a whole, labour's share is in the range of 77 -80 per cent through the 1980s. Positive cashflow depended entirely on very high rates of capacity utilisation which were sustained through the 1980s but collapsed with the end of the German reunification boom in 1991. Other European economies, like France and Italy, which started the 1980s with high labour shares benefited from the upturn in the later 1980s and succeeded in reducing labour's share; there is no corresponding improvement in the German case. Equally ominous, the crisis of cost recovery engulfs whole sectors of core industries right across the advanced countries. The predicament of autos and electricals is particularly striking because these have been leading sectors which together employ a large percentage of the workforce in most advanced countries; if we add the out of sector employment sustained by vehicle manufacture, autos alone directly and indirectly account for between 12 and 25 per cent of manufacturing employment. Preliminary research indicates that electronics and electricals are in as much of a mess as autos; Japanese firms like Hitachi and Toshiba have seen a 30 per cent reduction in their cash flow over the period of the 1980s. The problems in cars are graphically illustrated by Table 8 which presents data on cash flow per vehicle produced by three American and three Japanese assemblers. Of the Japanese assemblers, Toyota as market leader and Honda as successful minor, are steadily and securely cash generative: but the second largest assembler, Nissan, is chronically weak and needs a domestic boom, such as it enjoyed in the late 1980s, before it can generate $800 of cash per vehicle. To be fair, these are vertically disintegrated firms which have much of their cash flow in suppliers. Whether they can access this cash is, however, doubtful at least in the case of Nissan which was so financially embarrassed by 1993 that it was considering the sale of its equity stakes in its suppliers. As for the American firms, Ford (which downsized in the late 1970s) is securely cash generative. The two other firms of Chrysler and General Motors (GM) have a pattern of feast and famine which is determined by cyclical movements in the saturated American car market; in a good year they can generate $1,500 or more per vehicle and in a bad year they have to borrow short term to cover the costs of model replacement. So far at least, the two American firms have suffered a burden of increasing indebtedness because they cannot pay back all that they borrow on the succeeding upswing. Re-normalisation of labour's share and the restoration of cash generation is all the more problematic because an increasing number of firms in all the advanced countries must now encounter the market conditions which have largely frustrated GM and Chrysler's best efforts. If the Germans have a supply side problem about the expense of their social settlement, all the rest have a demand side problem about saturated and cyclical markets within their bloc. It is generally accepted that macro economic conditions have deteriorated in the past twenty years since the long post-war boom collapsed into the first oil crisis. The point we would add is that micro economic conditions in the markets for autos, electricals and electronic goods are increasingly bleak, as demonstrated in Table 9 .
The recent history of the US car market shows the EC its future. The American car market is saturated with three cars for every two economically active persons; the American car market has not shown any sustained volume growth and the sales peak of 11.35 million cars in 1973 has never been surpassed; replacement demand is highly volatile and the market is prone to demand collapse which knocks sales volume down by 25-30 per cent in every downturn. As table 9 shows, the EC 12 experience over the past twenty years has been considerably more favourable; this is a market which has a history of volume growth so that each cycle has historically taken volume sales to a higher level. But, in our view, the vista from 1994 onwards is of flat EC demand with intermittent cyclical collapse. The underlying problem is market saturation at lower levels of automobility than in the US which is larger, richer and more car centred. The EC already has a park of 135 million cars and the "big four" national economies have a park of 106 million cars; this represents one car for every economically active person or 60 cars for every square kilometre of the EC. The industry's efforts to produce a durable, long life product may even reduce sales in the medium term; only 17 per cent of cars in the EC are over 9 years old, whereas in America 27 per cent of the park is over 9 years old. The end result, in the present recession, is an increasingly desperate attempt to shift product by offering deep discounts; in early 1994, fleet buyers of GM (Vauxhall) cars in the UK could expect discounts of more than 40 per cent on list which was hardly good for GM Europe's cash flow. In consumer electricals and electronics, the market problems are different but equally threatening to cash flow. In electronics at least there is the possibility of stimulating consumer demand by developing new products for the mass market. The industry has however found it increasingly difficult to develop new "must have" products to replace old products like colour televisions which are now available at next to nothing prices. The VCR of the mid 1980s was the industry's last winner; fewer than 40 per cent of European households have CD players, microwaves or video cameras because the current generation of new products either requires expensive software or performs supplementary functions which many can live without. Table 11 illustrates the problems by considering the price, volume and real market value trends over the decade from 1983 to 1993 in the markets for ten old and new products across the four major European national markets which account for 65 to 75 per cent of EC sales in these product lines. The market trends for new and existing product lines are profoundly discouraging because the electrical and electronics firms have been cutting prices without realising the benefits of increased demand. Price cuts are nearly universal; the unit price has been falling in old products such as colour televisions as well as in new products like microwaves and video cameras and in mechanical products such as cookers and washing machines as well as in electronic products like VCRs. But the impact on volume has been generally disappointing; only four relatively new products (microwaves, VCRs, video cameras and home computers) manage volume increases of more than 50 per cent and only the two newest products (micro waves and video cameras) manage spectacular volume increases of more than 500 per cent. Declining prices and weak volume increases combine arithmetically to reduce the overall value of the market in real 1983 prices; in six of the ten product lines market value declines and only two of the remaining four cases (microwaves and video cameras) show large increases in the value of the market. Our interpretation is that uncontrolled price cuts in saturated markets are not stimulating demand but undermining the conditions of cost recovery. This looks like the end of mass production without flex spec anywhere in sight and puts in question the widespread assumption that consumers are prepared to pay more for sophistication and variety; insofar as consumers are buying a multiplicity of new products in relatively small volumes they are imposing large extra development and tooling costs which are hardly good for cost recovery. These European observations from two important sectors do not of course imply global market saturation in all sectors. But it is difficult to be optimistic about the development of new sectors which could replace autos and electricals; and it is more difficult to believe that established high labour cost countries will benefit from the opening of new markets for old products. New sectors might, like the US cavalry, come charging in to rescue the situation. The question we would ask is simply: which sectors? All the techno hype about home cabling and business information highways avoids the central issue which is that knowledge based activities employ few workers and their market is limited by the expense of hardware and software. There is of course huge potential for growth in demand for traditional auto and electronics products in areas like the Pacific Rim; in Guangdong there is scope for selling one of the basic products (car, TV, VCR etc) to every household. The question of course is how much of this demand will be met by European, American or Japanese factories whose labour costs make them high cost producers.
The New World Order: Element (C) The Mutation of Institutions and Behaviour which Accompanies Problems about Cash Generation
The social accounting framework accommodates institutions, particularly through the concept of social settlement, but it does not endorse the widespread belief that institutional fixes can restore the competitiveness of the western economies. This belief comes in two variant political forms. The right wing liberal market variant argues the case for deregulation in general and freeing up the labour market in particular: the Americanization of Europe will solve the problem of Eurosclerosis, generally improve economic performance and specifically generate many new jobs. The centre left counters with the observed contrast in post-war performance between the relative failure of Britain and America and the relative success of Germany, Sweden and Japan. The left's variant argues that the Anglo American forms of capitalism are handicapped by their institutional structures, techniques and forms of calculation: the performance of Britain and America can be improved by some combination of Germanisation and Japanisation which would involve committed long term ownership and investment, workforce training and Japanese manufacturing techniques.
The policy prescriptions of the right and the centre left are manifestly different: the right recommends destruction of the indigenous social settlement through the economic programme of making the world more like the economics textbooks, whereas the centre left proposes imitation of the social settlements of the more successful through the politics of becoming somewhere else. But both programmes share a common a priori with two key elements: first, they both assume that the causal relation runs from institutions to performance; second, they both abstract from the necessary processes of adjustment and transformation. In this section we will question both elements of the a priori using evidence from Britain where the liberal market fix has been the principle of government policy and the centre left fix has figured prominently in opposition manifestos.
The problems of abstraction are clearest when the British government tries to defend its position on opting out of the European Community Social Chapter provisions which other member governments accept. In a radio interview (BBC, September 22, 1994 ) the British employment minister, Michael Portillo argued that if Britain refused provisions such as paternity leave and works councils, employment costs would be lower and Britain would then be competitive against new Asian producers of manufactures. This is a classic example of old order thinking which refuses to consider the new realities of disorder and the magnitude of the required adjustments. A small increase or decrease in British social charges might be relevant to intra-European competition but it will certainly not meet the challenge of Korea. That challenge requires a very large adjustment involving wage cuts of more than 50 per cent plus an increase in hours worked of around 50 per cent combined with a substantial cut in fringe benefits and social provision.
It is a challenge which some liberal market enthusists claim could be met by allowing the wages of all workers employed in world manufacturing to converge on an equilibrium level of around 7.50$ per hour when consumers would benefit from the cheaper manufactures that then became available. This fantasy abstracts from all the real problems of the adjustment path in a country with a European style social settlement. The main burden of adjustment would fall arbitrarily on the minority of the workforce employed in the tradeable (manufacturing) goods sector and, as living costs would not fall pari passu, there would, under European conditions, be a vast increase in dependence via various forms of subvention such as rent rebates. In any case, none of the advanced economies are likely to go down this path. With or without trade unions, with or without mass unemployment, labour markets are segmented in ways which limit downwards wage adjustment whose knock on effects on the overall demand for labour are in any case uncertain. Wages will not flex, or not enough to meet the Korean challenge, so workers will be displaced as value added is transferred elsewhere. In the new disorder of free trade with absolute wage disparities of more than 2:1, the liberal market solutions propose policies which are likely to spread disemployment and deteriorating pay and conditions without securing the objective of competitivity. The policies of Portillo and the Conservative government will put more beggars on the street and more homeless underneath the arches when they are applied in a country which has already seen a dramatic deterioration in the balance between high and low wage blue collar employment. Table 12 summarises the main structural developments of the past 15 years: since 1977 in a small country with a workforce of around 25 million, the number of manufacturing, full time and male jobs has declined by between 1.6 and 3 million while service, part time and women's jobs have increased by between 1.1 and 2.5 million. This amounts to a deterioration in the composition of employment because, in the UK, service jobs on average pay wages which are 75 per cent of those in manufacturing; and female pay is on average 80 per cent of male pay. This kind of deterioration in the composition of employment creates structural economic problems because wages and salaries sustain private consumption which accounts for most of the demand in the economy. It also creates political and social welfare problems about increasing dependence and exclusion from citizenship; under European conditions, flexible labour markets means pricing people back into jobs and a life of dependence. If the right's policies are pernicious, the centre left's are implausible because they make the orthodox optimist assumption about the one way causal relation from (better) institutions leading to (superior) performance. They do not consider the pessimist possibility that the relation also runs the other way from (inferior) performance to (worse) institutions.
The evidence on these issues is, of course, ambiguous. Table 13 summarises the evidence on cash flow per employee in the manufacturing sectors of different advanced economies and, at first sight, illustrates the superiority of cash flow generation of British and American institutions. In the early 1980s UK manufacturing generates as much or more cash per employee than most of the mainland European competitors like Italy and France; while American manufacturing turns in a super performance with up to twice as much cash per employee than some of its competitors which at times included Japan. It is true that the Anglo American stock exchange requires cash for distribution and the corporate sector obliges by generating the necessary cash surplus; in a country like Britain half of profit and a quarter of cash flow are currently distributed in the form of dividends. We would argue however that this financial evidence should be read in the context of productive and market performance. In the British case, our interpretation is that Table 13 shows how it is usually possible to find cash by productive and market retreat. In a decade of case studies on British firms we have documented a structural process of hollowing out and a behavioural shift to financial engineering or the shuffling of assets which serves no productive purpose: firms like British GEC pioneered defensive deindustrialization through market retreat from the 1970s onwards (Williams et al. 1983 ) while conglomerates like Hanson pioneered deal driven offensive running for cash in the 1980s (Adcroft et al. 1991) .
The case of the Anglo-American conglomerate Hanson is particularly interesting because this low tech manufacturing and commodity producer has through dealing achieved financial ratios which could not be achieved by operating in these sectors. In the early 1980s Hanson had an ordinary labour share of value added around 70 per cent but, from 1987 onwards, labour's share has been maintained in a range of 43-53 per cent. Lords Hanson and White, who run the conglomerate, had the prescience to recognise the coming crisis well before the rest of us; their defensive operating response was to choose sheltered manufacturing activities and commodities, avoid businesses where the Japanese were active, concentrate on low tech activities with modest investment cash requirements, and incentivise their managers to strip labour out of operations. Unfortunately, Lord Hanson's prescience is not matched by his responsibility in the increasingly desperate pursuit of cash. The 50 per cent labour share depended on dealing in companies and selling on parts of what Hanson bought as SCM and Imperial Tobacco. Dealing hit the wall in 1990 as the economy turned down; since then Lord Hanson has undermined his balance sheet by buying businesses (like Peabody and Cavenham) where the earnings came cheap because they are tied to provisions which go straight into Hanson's balance sheet.
Hanson is a creation of the British stock exchange; German firms are not under such strong external financial pressure to distribute. But, if internal cash generation fails, something must be done to safeguard the productive and market future. From this point of view, the drying up of German cash flow over the 1980s, like the deterioration in the Japanese position after 1991, is worrying because the financially embarrassed are always tempted into irresponsible short termism. This can be illustrated from the current restructuring in the European car industry which we have analyzed in two recent public interest reports on BMW's purchase of Rover (Williams et al., 1994a) and the abortive Volvo merger with Renault (Williams et al., 1993) . BMW was opportunistically seeking productive and market advantage: the purchase of Rover for £900 million was a cheap way of entering 4 wheel drive and small cars. Volvo's senior management was seeking financial advantage because the merger with Renault was a way of exiting the auto business and getting further into pharmaceuticals, matches and margarine. We doubt whether Swedish workers can again rely on Swedish investors to block this kind of Hansonism: if truth is the first casualty of war, then social responsibility is the first casualty of cash shortage.
If (or when) the late capitalist world ends, it will not be with one big macro economic bang but with many small micro economic whimpers. The micro shocks caused by managers' attempts to save themselves and meet external requirements are likely to damage the institutions of countries like Germany and Japan which represent the economic achievement of the post-1945 period; the new disorder threatens both the European forms of co-determination incorporating strong unions and the Japanese form of job security for some. More generally, a cumulating burden of unwaged or low waged dependence would inflict secondary damage on the redistributive welfare institutions of Western Europe which are the enduring social legacy of the post war settlements. With 10 million at or near social security levels, the British seem to have already reached the limits of their political will to redistribute through higher taxes. If problems about cash generation undermine institutions as well as change behaviour, the difference of German and Japanese capitalism may not be sustainable and the laggard irresponsible Anglo-American forms of capitalism may show Germany and Japan their future. In that case British and American centrism becomes entirely irrelevant; how can we solve our problems by becoming something which is ceasing to exist?
Policy Implications
The economic shift from modernity to post modernity can be characterised in many ways through different kinds of work on the fault lines and slippages around the transition. Within the frameworks of economics or social accounting, the shift can be characterised as an unblocking of limits on the circulation of, and competition between, productive inputs and outputs. In his book The Work of Nations Robert Reich (1992) has championed this kind of problem definition: the post modern problem is the new mobility of productive capital which can only be attracted to America by investment in training the American workforce. In our view, Reich mis-specifies the problem and the appropriate policy response.
Reich exaggerates the mobility of productive capital which is in any case neither a necessary or sufficient condition of the present crisis. Manufacturing investment accounted for 20 per cent or less of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow in the 1980s. The manufacturing investment flow of this decade was mainly between high wage blocks where it served to create capacity in high income markets: in 1991, the cumulative stock of American FDI in Europe was ten times larger than the stock in low wage Asia (excluding Japan). The Japanese transplants of the 1980s in Europe and America of the 1980s represented nothing more than a further instalment of old style investment in market access which will no doubt continue as the Koreans and Taiwanese get in on this act. The new disorder is distinctive because it contains the possibility of large scale movement in search of low production costs: all the advanced countries have most of their capacity in high cost social settlements and could improve cost recovery by shifting to low cost social settlements in a new kind of movement on which there are few restraints and for which there is little precedent.
The condition of the new mobility of capital is the old, long established mobility of goods: low wage factories require free access to high income markets. The 1940s architects of the post-war order envisaged free trade in goods which was progressively and imperfectly realised over the next forty years. Although, the 1980s deregulators added free movement of capital nobody envisaged or allowed the pre-1914 style of free movement of population in pursuit of economic opportunity. The unspoken assumption was that the free movement of goods but not of peoples would make the world safe for the advanced countries. And, for a while, these rules did prevent the undermining of social settlements in the advanced countries by immigrants at the factory gate. But these rules did not deliver permanent security because, when and if the exchange of manufactures ceases to take the form of exchange between advanced countries, the import and export of goods itself becomes a form of social exchange and competition which can undermine advanced country settlements.
In this eventuality, the appropriate policy response is not supply side tinkering but new blocks on the exchange of goods. Benjamin Franklin's aphorism "no nation was ever ruined by trade" provides the current principle of trade policy which is instituted in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) type multilateralism. Our policy alternative is more discriminating. Free trade between the advanced countries is appropriate because competition between different countries with broadly similar social settlements and limited differences in wages and hours is necessary and beneficial. But free trade between different social settlements with large disparities in wages and hours is inappropriate because this kind of competition is economically unfair and socially destructive for the advanced countries. To make the same point more positively, access to advanced country markets by low wage new entrants should be made conditional upon changes in their social settlements; market access should, for example, be made conditional upon a reduction in excessive hours. As we have argued in the British case (Williams et al., 1994d) , these external policies for tradeable goods need to be complemented by internal policies for sheltered sectors which reestablish the internal social floor and limit the spread of sweated and casualised employment.
It will of course be argued that we are defending privilege by proposing policies which will block the economic progress of the Third World. In reply we would suggest that, whilst this raises a serious issue, the choices need not be so stark. Thus, for example the development of Guangdong province and coastal China in this generation, or of India in the next, does not require export led growth which lays waste manufacturing in the advanced countries: the development of China and India could and should be mainly sustained by internal linkages within large and growing markets. It should be possible to constitute an international economy where such countries have a large part of the regional and bloc development gain without irresponsibly hazarding the institutions of the already developed world. We should always remember that there is no automatic mechanism of institutional compensation which generates progressive institutions in Asia as fast as they can be destroyed in Europe or North America: economic development in Guangdong province may not generate political democracy leave alone trade unionism and countervailing power. Practically, the issue is not whether we block Third World development but whether we countenance the recreation of the Third World in the First.
